The Formation of Economic Perceptions in Post-Communist Countries of East Central Europe by Yuliya V. Tverdova
ORI GIN AL PA PER
The Formation of Economic Perceptions
in Post-Communist Countries of East Central Europe
Yuliya V. Tverdova
Published online: 18 March 2011
 The Author(s) 2011. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract In the early transition phase in post-communist Europe, citizens’ per-
ceptions of the national economy appeared more favorable than objective economic
indicators would suggest. With triple and quadruple digit annual inflation rates and a
severe economic contraction, there was a substantial portion of the population in
these countries who still thought that the national economy had been and would be
improving. Thus, sociotropic economic perceptions in the wake of the democratic
transformation appeared to be disconnected from the real economic situation. The
purpose of this paper is threefold. First, it explores the link between objective
economic indicators and public evaluations of the economy. Second, it investigates
the microfoundations of economic perceptions. And finally, it tests a well-estab-
lished proposition that political sophisticates are more accurate in their perceptions
than their less informed counterparts. The findings of the study can be generalized to
any political and economic system undergoing transition.
Keywords Economic perceptions  Post-communist  Transition  Economic
voting  Information shortcuts  Accountability
One of the grounding postulates of democratic theory is the principle of
accountability. The theoretical operation of the accountability mechanism is quite
simple: elected officials bear responsibility for their performance and receive reward
or punishment from their constituency accordingly in the form of re-election or
denial of a future political mandate. In reference to economic accountability, the
mechanism presumes government responsibility for the state of the national
economy, also known as economic voting (Lewis-Beck 1988; Page and Shapiro
Y. V. Tverdova (&)
University of California–Irvine, 3151 Social Science Plaza, Irvine, CA 92697, USA
e-mail: tverdova@uci.edu
123
Polit Behav (2012) 34:137–158
DOI 10.1007/s11109-011-9160-2
1992; Alvarez and Nagler 1998; Nannestad et al. 2003). As noted by Nannestad and
Paldam (2000), the link between the state of the national economy, or ‘‘objective’’
economy, and the act of voting proceeds through several phases. First, objective
economic information has to be perceived by potential voters. The resulting
perceptions ideally reflect economic reality. Then, public perceptions must be
connected to evaluations of government economic competence and, finally, lead to a
voting decision.
For a long time, economic voting models treated economic perceptions as
exogenous and based on reality. Without the latter, the normatively appealing
mechanism of electoral accountability breaks down. Without the former, scholars
face the unpleasant endogeneity dilemma. Empirical studies, however, have been
consistently pointing to the fact that democratic publics are less sophisticated than
expected by democratic theorists, and their economic assessments often deviate
from macro-economic realities (Borre 1997; Evans 1999). Most importantly, a
number of recent works––a revisionist trend in the economic voting literature––
have demonstrated that these deviations are systematic, rather than random, in
nature (Anderson 2007; Wlezien et al. 1997; Anderson et al. 2004; Johnston et al.
2005; Enns and Anderson 2009; Evans and Andersen 2006; Evans 1999).
Along with personal economic experiences, the revisionist argument places a
major emphasis on people’s political predispositions as a source of economic biases.
A part of the argument deals with the endogenous effect of past vote choice, which
is also known in the literature as the ‘‘winner-loser effect’’ (Anderson et al. 2007). In
this story, having voted for the winner of the election makes one more likely to have
a positive outlook on government’s economic performance, whereas having voted
for the loser increases the probability of negative perceptions. The reason behind
this claim is an intrinsic desire in humans to maintain cognitive consistency
(Festinger 1957; Mattila 1998; Vla´chova´ 2001).
A larger theoretical framework includes any form of political attitudes likely to
influence one’s general evaluations of government performance. Partisanship and
political ideology are certainly central to this line of argument (Enns and Anderson
2009; Evans and Andersen 2006; Evans 1999). Instead of relying on objective
economic indicators, voters view the economy through the prism of partisan lens
and assign credit and blame accordingly. Also, since partisanship drives both
economic evaluations and voter choice, the relationship between the latter two may
be significantly overstated (Wlezien et al. 1997; Johnston et al. 2005; Evans and
Andersen 2006; Anderson et al. 2004; Enns et al. 2008; Conover et al. 1987). The
most recent series of studies investigates how electoral expectations affect public
economic forecasts and actual consumption behavior (Ladner and Wlezien 2007;
Enns and Anderson 2009; Gerber and Huber 2009, 2010). When partisans anticipate
their party to win the next election, they tend to develop more optimistic perceptions
of the future economy. Moreover, partisans adjust their economic decisions based
on whether their preferred party holds power, which further establishes a powerful
effect that political variables exert over economic perceptions and behavior.
The causal relationship between economic and political variables has been a hot
topic among the scholars of economic voting. While there is a fairly broad
agreement that politics affects economic perceptions, the causal flow is likely to run
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in both directions. The most recent work by Lewis-Beck et al. (2008) struck back at
revisionists with new sophisticated evidence about the importance of economic
assessments for political decisions. Using data from three Western democracies––
the US, Canada and the UK––the authors demonstrate a strong direct effect of
economic perceptions on political behavior. Yet they also confirm that economic
evaluations are endogenous to political variables.
In times of economic crises and transition, the relationship between economic
reality and perceptions may be even more distorted. On one hand, economic turmoil
introduces distress into daily lives of individuals, which may lead to heavy reliance
on personal economic experiences for judging the national economy (Mutz 1992).
On the other hand, economic transitions (and crises) often bear a high degree of
uncertainty and volatility, thus making it harder for citizens to assess the situation
accurately. This study explores the level of distortion between the objective
economy and public economic perceptions at the wake of post-communist transition
in East Central Europe. It aims at identifying the possible sources of economic
biases as well as the mediating forces behind them.
With the collapse of the command economy, the general economic conditions in
these countries hit rock bottom, and most people found themselves in deep poverty.
While citizens fought for everyday economic survival, the elites fought for political
survival by making promises of a prosperous economic future (e.g. Ahl 1999). Yet a
closer look at public economic perceptions alongside indicators of the macro
economy during the early transition reveals some noticeable discrepancies between
a poor national economic state and unusually high sociotropic evaluations
(comparable to public economic assessments in developed democracies for the
corresponding time period), especially regarding the near-term economic future.
This leads to my first research question of whether the link between objective
economic indicators and popular perceptions of the economy break down during a
transition that includes economic and political restructuring. It may be that the
transition in regime form shapes economic perceptions and expectations indepen-
dent of reality. Similar to how partisanship affects economic perceptions in stable
democracies, adherents of the new regime are buoyed by a sense of optimism of the
changes ahead, while adherents of the old regime are overly pessimistic. The
economic turbulence of the transition may also blur perceptions of the objective
economic conditions. The question, then, is: Did the ‘‘objective’’ state of the
national economy drive sociotropic economic perceptions in the emerging
democracies of East Central Europe at the beginning of the post-communist
transition?
If, however, as I suspect, economic perceptions of post-communist citizens were
inaccurate, what would be the major possible sources of these biases? Most scholars
of public opinion in general and economic perceptions in particular draw heavily on
decision-making and opinion formation theories developed by social psychologists
(Kahneman et al. 1982; Plous 1993; Gilovich et al. 2002). They assert that
individuals rely on heuristic mechanisms to form opinions rather than engage in
knowledge-based deliberation. It is generally believed that relying on heuristics and
wishful thinking is inversely related to the level of knowledge on a certain subject.
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Yet, some argued that even most knowledgeable individuals often resort to
heuristics while making decisions in circumstances of uncertainty.
Thus, the second research question calls for the identification of important
heuristics (also known as motives or shortcuts) that should help us understand in a
systematic way how economic judgments were formed in East Central Europe.
Building upon previous economic voting studies, I posit that citizens used the most
accessible and salient information available to them at the time of the survey, such
as their personal economic well-being and political affiliations, and especially
attitudes toward the new regime. Moreover, people’s attitudes toward the new (and
old) regime in general may have attenuated the way they viewed the national
economy. Those who were enthused about the change could have been more
motivated to form positive economic evaluations, both past and future. As a result,
in supporters, the link between the objective and subjective economies may have
been more distorted.
Finally, economic sophistication may operate as a mediating mechanism between
information shortcuts and national economic evaluations. Those with more
knowledge of the economy should be less compelled to rely on heuristics. My
third hypothesis, therefore, is interactive in nature and deals with the proposition
that economic sophisticates should be more accurate in their economic evaluations
than their less informed counterparts.
Economic Perceptions in Central and Eastern Europe:
Knowledge-based or Wishing Thinking?
The scope of the research from over almost two decades of economic voting studies
in the post-communist nations has reached that of Western democracies (see Tucker
2002 for a comprehensive review). Yet studies exploring the formation of economic
evaluations per se are scarce. To date, a study by Anderson and O’Connor (2000) is
the only systematic analysis of the formation of economic perceptions in that region.
Specifically, the authors examined the formation of economic perceptions in East
Germany under conditions of radical system change. Their findings revealed a poor
match between objective economic conditions and public perceptions about the
national economy during the initial stage of the transition. However, as time passed,
sociotropic perceptions started tracking the objective economy more closely.
Anderson and O’Connor’s study suggests that economic evaluations are both
knowledge based and affective. East German citizens were inaccurate in the wake of
the transition because they lacked knowledge about the transition, but also because
they experienced euphoria after the communist system collapsed. The authors
posited that people in new democracies had to ‘‘learn’’ before they began to form
more accurate perceptions of the economy, i.e. congruent with objective economic
indicators. Moreover, once the early stage of transition––the ‘‘honeymoon’’––
passed, people became more critical of the conditions in the country and started to
hold the current government, not the past regime as during the ‘‘honeymoon’’
period, accountable for the state of the economy.
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Given the specific research question the authors had in mind, however, they did
not explore the mechanism of individual-level opinion formation in the early
transition, and were thus unable to provide insight into whether economic
perceptions were systematically driven by factors other than the objective economy.
This is what this study aims to do. One of the most plausible explanations offered by
social psychologists and political scientists is that people tend to simplify the
decision-making process and heavily rely on heuristics, motivated reasoning, as
well as wishful thinking, especially when their knowledge on the subject is sparse
(Kahneman et al. 1982; Zaller 1992; Lau and Redlawsk 2001; Kuklinski et al. 2001;
Neuwirth et al. 2002).
Dolan and Holbrook (2001) have aptly described the debate about the sources of
public opinion as the role of affect versus cognition in the formation of perceptions.
In the absence of cognitive resources, but arguably even when such resources are
present (Kahneman et al. 1982; Babad 1995), individuals tend to resort to emotion,
affect, and predispositions to help them form judgments (Lavine et al. 2005). As a
general rule, people tend to fit their perceptions of reality into their preexisting
picture of the world or a set of longstanding preferences (Dolan and Holbrook
2001), thus achieving cognitive consistency (Festinger 1957). In the end, people’s
aspirations for cognitive consistency lead them to be highly selective in what
information they receive or accept according to their predispositions (Dolan and
Holbrook 2001; Lavine et al. 2005). Put differently, individuals are likely to reach
conclusions that they want to reach (Kunda 1990).
Wishful thinking is a related concept, which mostly refers to perceptions about
the future. In a series of experiments, social psychologists revealed that wishful
thinking is widely present among sports fans and even sports bettors who ignore the
odds of their favorite team to win (Babad 1987; Babad and Katz 1991). In electoral
studies, the effect of wishful thinking has been explored in the U.S., Sweden, Israel
and other democratic states (Granberg and Brent 1983; Babad et al. 1992; Babad
and Yacobos 1993; Babad 1995). All of the authors registered the operation of a
wishful thinking mechanism among voters in predicting election outcomes.
However, the investigation of the role of knowledge in attenuating the effect of
wishful thinking has yielded mixed results. Whereas Granberg and Brent (1983)
found that in US presidential elections wishful thinking was strongest among poorly
informed citizens, Babad (1995) was unable to support this finding in his study of
the 1992 Israeli election.
If people’s perceptions of the economy at the early transition stage in East
Central Europe were disconnected from the objective economic reality, what were
they based on? Zaller (1992) asserts that it would be the most accessible
information––information ‘off the top of your head’––that would be retrieved from
the memory to form a judgment. According to some, personal experiences and
interpersonal communication are important sources of sociotropic economic
perceptions (Mutz 1992; Conover et al. 1986). Mutz (1992) further insists that
personal experience is ‘‘superior’’ to all other sources of sociotropic economic
perceptions. The mechanism here is very simple: personal experience (whether a
person’s own experience or experience of somebody from his or her social
environment) is difficult to deny and can be used as a powerful base for critical
Polit Behav (2012) 34:137–158 141
123
evaluation of economic information coming from other sources. Because personal
experiences and interpersonal communication patterns vary by individual, percep-
tions derived from these experiences are also likely to be individually determined,
and therefore could be systematically biased (Duch et al. 2000).
Another major source of perceptual economic biases derives from people’s
political predispositions. As a result of numerous revisions of the traditional
economic voting modes, there is a general agreement now about the importance of
political variables for economic perceptions. Most individuals form political values
and even party attachments early in their lives and tend to judge future information
about the world based on their political ideology. Recent history of the post-
communist transformations revealed the duality of the transition; in other words,
political reforms were closely intertwined with economic reforms (e.g. Colton 2000;
Duch 1993; Przeworski 1991; To´ka 1995)1. Consistent with this, I posit that
political and economic evaluations were closely connected in people’s minds. Those
who expressed satisfaction with political performance may have also expressed
satisfaction with economic performance even if in actuality national economic
indicators signaled a severe crisis.
In addition, mass media and new political elites were very active in
disseminating information about democratic ideas. Thus, we can assume the
existence of a certain level of support for democracy and the market even at the
early stages of democratization. Besides, the notion of democracy was likely to
represent a political system different or even opposite to the past Soviet system.2
People who expressed support for a certain political order (the new or the old one)
may also be expected to be more tolerant of the hardships associated with
establishing and maintaining this regime, including economic shortcomings (Gibson
1996a, b).
Besides personal experiences and political predispositions, citizens in East
Central Europe, as citizens in any other country, also differed in their access to
political and economic information as well as their ability to process it. It is
1 A connection between the polity and the economy is obvious to the extent that political decisions and
government politics affect economic behavior and business performance. Concurrently, economic
outcomes prompt politicians either to modify the current economic policies, develop new ones, or to
continue with the old policies. In Western democracies, public evaluations of the national economy have
been found to be affected by assessments of government performance, but the magnitude of this
relationship is modest. The effect of political evaluations on mass opinion of the national economic state
in the post-communist nations is expected to be of higher substantive value, because democratic reforms
were interwoven into economic reforms.
2 It is noteworthy that Russia displays substantially lower public support for the ideal of democracy than
all the other post-communist countries. For example, according to Political Indicators compiled by
Fessel-GfK (Austria), only 32 percent of respondents in Russia expressed full support for democracy in
2001 compared to at least 45 percent in the next lowest case (Bulgaria). The highest support for
democracy that Russia ever displayed was in 1994 (50 percent), and in all other years before and after
1994 it never rose higher than 40 percent, which is substantially lower than in other post-communist
countries. This may be partially determined by the exclusive role that the Russian Federation played in
the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as on the whole territory of the communist space.
Consequently, after losing the hegemonic power over the rest of the communist states, some Russians
may have felt nostalgic about the Soviet Union; hence, they expressed lower support for a democratic
system.
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common to think that political sophistication gives people more intellectual and
material resources to form accurate evaluations of the reality and act rationally.
Empirical studies of the mediating effect of political sophistication on the formation
of public opinion, however, have yielded mixed results (Zaller 1992; Babad 1995;
Kumlin 2001; Baum 2002). Karp et al. (2003), for instance, found that more and less
politically aware persons base their evaluations of the EU on different factors. In
particular, more sophisticated individuals incorporate assessments of EU institu-
tions, while their less informed counterparts do not. In contrast, Goren (2004)
claimed that people at various levels of sophistication had more or less uniform core
values and beliefs and relied equally on them when forming political judgments.
Many social scientists also assert that a higher level of education is likely to
enhance political knowledge (Berggren 2001). This assumption, however, may not
have held in the post-communist nations during the initial stage of the transfor-
mation for at least two reasons. Firstly, at the beginning of the transition reforms,
the highly educated were unlikely to have better knowledge of democracy and the
market than the less educated, because these topics were not covered during the
course of formal schooling during socialism. Information on the Western
democratic system was also unavailable from other sources except underground
or smuggled publications. Thus, the more educated were not privileged, save a few,
in having a better understanding on how democracy worked, although they may
have had higher learning capabilities.
Secondly, judging by the literature on income structure in post-communist
nations, positive returns to education were negligible (Jensen 2003). Put differently,
persons with higher formal education were not likely to have a better salary.
Consequently, it would not be fair to say that the more educated could enjoy better
opportunities, financially speaking, to access information. Having said that,
however, it is unreasonable to deny that education contributes to the development
of better logical skills, and hence advanced information processing skills, in general.
In contrast, interpersonal communication is a cheap way to acquire economic and
political information. Essentially, all it takes is a willingness to engage in a political
conversation, and sometimes even less than that––simply listening to what other
people say. Thus, political discussion may become a primary source of economic
and political information leading to the formation of public opinion. Based on past
research, many individuals do not form political judgments from media reports
before they discuss them with someone they trust on political matters. Conveniently,
such a trustworthy person is normally not hard to find, since individuals, on average,
tend to think that people around them are more politically sophisticated than they
are.
Again, in the context of newly emerging democracies, when information was
scattered and confusing, interpersonal discussion may have become the most
influential source of knowledge on the economy and politics. Political discussion is
likely to lead to biased economic judgments, since one’s discussion networks tend
to be homogeneous. In post-communist nations, similar to other countries in this
regard, discussion networks were traditionally comprised of relatives, friends, and
colleagues, thus providing anecdotal evidence in support of the homogeneity
assumption. Moreover, the tone of political discourse was person-centered with a
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prevailing pessimistic connotation (Shevchenko 2001; Ries 1997). In other words,
people often complained in private conversations, thus possibly contributing to the
creation of a negative image of the general situation in the country.
What follows from the above may be summarized in four general hypotheses
tested in the present study.
Hypothesis 1 There was no substantively significant relationship between
objective economic indicators and public perceptions of the national economy at
the early phase of the post-communist transition, even if the relationship was
statistically significant.
Hypothesis 2a Perceptions of the national economic situation at the early stage of
the post-communist transition were driven by personal economic experiences,
attitudes toward the new and old regime, as well as evaluations of the performance
of the political system.
Hypothesis 2b Perceptions of the national economy at the early state of the post-
communist transition were attenuated by individuals’ attitudes to the new and old
political regimes.
Hypothesis 3 Perceptions of the national economy at the early stage of the post-
communist transition were attenuated by individuals’ levels of political sophisti-
cation (measured here as education and political discussion).
Preliminary Evidence
Let me begin by painting a broader picture of the economic reality and economic
perceptions in the post-communist region in the early 1990 s. Table 1 shows
objective economic data for 17 new democracies in the region for 1991–1992
collected by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and aggregate
retrospective and prospective perceptions of the national economy for 1992 taken
from the respective Central and Eastern Eurobarometer study.3 In addition, Table 1
depicts the proportions of the population in those countries who thought that the
national economic situation had gotten better or much better over the previous year.
A first look at the inflation, unemployment, and GDP growth rates in the 17
nations for 1991–1992 would probably make us think that there should be no one in
those countries who would think that the national economic situation had improved.
How can a triple-digit inflation rate be considered an improvement? However, as
can be clearly seen from Table 1, a significant portion of the population in post-
communist countries in 1992 thought that the national economy had gotten better in
3 The macroeconomic data come from a 1999 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
Report. Because these data may have been reevaluated and recalculated retrospectively, some concerns
exist about how close these data are compared to the ones that post-communist citizens received through
the media at the time of the survey. To address this concern, I searched for the macroeconomic data
released around the time of the survey. The journal Economics of Transition used to publish quarterly
reports of the economic developments in the region and their statistics were largely of the same
magnitude as the EBRD report.
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spite of the dreadful economic statistics for that year. In one-third of the countries,
over 20% of the citizens evaluated the national economy as improving. In another
third of the countries more than 10% thought that the economy had performed better
than 12 months before. In Albania and Slovenia, the proportion of population
approving of past economic performance exceeded one-third.
Looking ahead, post-communist citizens tended to be even more optimistic. In all
17 countries in the 1992 survey, future economic forecasts for the following year
were much more favorable than evaluations of past performance, which suggests
that wishful thinking may very well have taken place of pure rationality. Thus,
almost three quarters of Albanians felt positively about the economic future of their
country. In Slovenia and Bulgaria, economic optimists constituted a majority; yet
over 80 percent of Hungarians and Armenians did not envision any improvement in
their national economies for the year ahead. In the rest of the countries, the figure
for those who believed in the economy getting better ranges from about 20 to 40
percent.
Although a more thorough analysis is necessary to estimate the relationship
between objective and subjective economies, the first look suggests that there is
some degree of incongruence between the reality and public perceptions. This lack
of congruence would be consistent with Anderson and O’Connor’s (2000) study of
national economic evaluations in East Germany. Recall that the authors explained
the disconnection between public opinion and the economic reality by a lack of
Table 1 Favorable sociotropic perceptions and national economic indicators by country









1991 1992 1991 1992 1991 1992
Albania 46.53 74.72 104.0 236.6 9.5 27.0 -27.7 -7.2
Armenia 3.71 16.81 25.0 1341.0 3.5 -10.8 -52.6
Belarus 9.42 20.24 93.0 1159.0 .0 .5 -1.2 -9.6
Bulgaria 30.55 50.61 339.0 79.4 10.5 13.2 -11.7 -7.3
Czech 23.81 37.66 52.0 12.7 4.1 2.6 -14.2 -3.3
Slovakia 13.50 24.06 58.0 9.1 11.8 11.4 -14.6 -6.5
Georgia 12.40 42.46 131.0 1177.0 .9 -13.8 -44.8
Hungary 9.21 18.43 32.0 21.6 7.8 13.2 -11.9 -3.1
Latvia 7.25 25.03 262.0 959.0 2.3 -8.3 -34.9
Lithuania 4.06 28.92 345.0 1161.1 .3 1.3 -13.4 -37.7
Macedonia 7.72 39.82 230.0 1925.2 19.2 19.8 -12.1 -21.1
Moldova 14.83 22.15 151.0 2198.0 .1 -17.5 -29.1
Poland 20.68 28.52 60.0 44.3 12.2 14.3 -7.0 2.6
Romania 26.39 39.56 223.0 199.2 8.2 -12.9 -8.7
Russia 13.95 28.06 144.0 2508.8 .0 4.8 -13.0 -14.5
Slovenia 35.75 55.66 247.0 92.9 8.2 11.6 -8.1 -5.5
Ukraine 10.61 29.72 161.1 2730.0 .0 .3 -9.0 -13.7
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familiarity about the new economic system and also by an overall euphoria about
the transition (see also To´ka 1995).
It should also come as no surprise that economic expectations seemed even more
detached from the current state of the economy than past economic evaluations.
While the economic past is already determined, the economic future is uncertain and
may be a projection of people’s high hopes for a quick recovery of the national
economy. As argued by Stokes and others (e.g. Stokes 1996, 2001; Przeworski
1996), in new democracies, people may believe that things have to become worse
before they get better; therefore, the drastic economic situation in East Central
Europe may have been perceived by the citizens as a sign of progress in the
transition. In summary, past studies of public opinion and electoral behavior in post-
communist Europe point us in two directions. First, the independence between
public economic perceptions and the actual economic conditions may be due to a
lack of knowledge in the early years of the transition. Second, we can expect post-
communist citizens to have adopted a more favorable interpretation of the reality
due to more psychological mechanisms underlying opinion formation, such as
relying on their predispositions to the new system, as well as having high hopes for
the transition. In the prospective case, however, high hopes may have been
grounded in quite rational calculations as people expected a newly emerging private
sector to create more high-paying jobs and expand the consumer market (Aghion
and Blanchard 1994; Rodrik 1995).
The Formation of Economic Perceptions: Data and Measures
Individual level data for my analysis come from the Central and Eastern
Eurobarometer Study No. 3 conducted in October–November of 1992. The 1992
surveys were the last ones in the Central and Eastern Eurobarometer series that
asked questions about sociotropic economic perceptions. The following studies only
included questions about people’s personal financial situation. However, 1992 is
ideal as a starting point in modeling sociotropic economic perceptions in newly
established democracies. We may expect that in 1992 memories of the old regime
were still fresh, but also that after a few years of democratic reforms people had
formed firm attitudes towards the new system. Thus, questions about sociotropic
economic perceptions would most likely prompt people to make a comparison
between the old and the new regimes. There are seventeen nations included in the
surveys, for which I have complete data for both stages of the analysis: Albania,
Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Georgia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, and
Ukraine.
Previous studies of economic voting have posed the question of whether voters
are forward-looking or retrospective (MacKuen et al. 1992; Erikson et al. 2000;
Suzuki and Cappell 1996; Suzuki 1991; Fiorina 1978). Although the rationality
assumption prescribes voters to use prospective evaluations of the national
economy, empirical analyses so far have shown more evidence supporting the
reward-punishment hypothesis or retrospective voting across a wide range of
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countries (e.g. Fiorina 1981; Lewis-Beck 1988; see also Hesli and Bashkirova
2001). It is important to note, however, that it may be challenging to clearly separate
retrospective from prospective voting. While voters appear retrospective, they may,
in fact, use information about past economic performance to form economic
forecasts. As collecting all relevant information to form accurate future predictions
is costly, many voters may extrapolate from the past. After all, past is usually the
best predictor of the future.
In post-communist countries, past studies of economic voting produced
somewhat contradictory results with respect to the retrospective-prospective voting
hypotheses (Pacek 1994; Przeworski 1996; Colton 1996; Harper 2000; Fidrmuc
2000a, b; see also Stokes 1996). In fact, some new democratic governments in those
countries achieved reelection under economic conditions that would be considered
fatal for any government in Western democracies. Given the mixed evidence of the
importance between past and future economic assessments, I examine both
retrospective and prospective sociotropic perceptions as my dependent variables.
The retrospective variable is based on the survey question which asked respondents
whether over the past twelve months the national economy in their countries has
gotten much better, better, stayed the same, has gotten worse, or much worse.
Similarly, the survey question about national economic forecasts asks for an
evaluation of the economic situation one year from the date of the interview. The
summary statistics on all the variables used in the study are available from the
author upon request.
For macroeconomic indicators, I chose three economic indicators that have been
most-widely used in the past studies of economic voting––the annual inflation,
unemployment, and GDP growth rate as described in Table 1. Since the survey data
were collected at the end of 1992 and given the wording of the dependent variable
questions, I considered it most appropriate to employ the change measures of the
inflation and growth rates from 1991 to 1992 (Anderson 1995). The underlying logic
for using change measures is that people may react differently to the same level of
unemployment and inflation in any given year depending on what the levels of
unemployment and inflation had been in the previous year or even further back in
history. For example, if the unemployment rate is running high in a certain year, but
it is still a decrease compared to the recent history, people may perceive it as an
improvement in the economic state. Theoretically, accounting for the recent
economic history may be a better way to tap into public perceptions of the economy.
Unfortunately, I am unable to use a change measure for unemployment rate due to
the unavailability of the 1991 data for a number of nations.4 For detailed definitions
and variable codes for all the variables in the model please contact the author
directly.
4 Some may have a legitimate concern that coding unemployment as a level variable as opposed to a
change variable may lead to a misspecification of the model. To insure my overall conclusions are not
undermined by the choice of measurements, I ran the models with all the macroeconomic indicators
measured at their 1992 levels. Neither system-level nor individual-level coefficients change to the extent
that would lead me to reevaluate my theory. However, in case of inflation, the coefficient in the
prospective case reaches statistical significance with the positive sign similar to unemployment.
Substantively, though, the effect of inflation is still negligible.
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Effects of Objective Economic Indicators on Sociotropic Perceptions
The baseline multivariate models of economic perceptions (without taking account
of the interactive effects) consist of the individual-level explanatory variables
capturing people’s personal economic situation, political preferences and evalua-
tions, attitudes towards the reforms, political sophistication, and demographic
characteristics, as well as the three measures of the objective economic state:
Retrospective perceptions ¼ f objective economy; personal economic variables;
political attitudes; controls

Prospective perceptions¼ f objective economy; retrospective sociotropic;
personal economic variables; political attitudes; controls

Given the ordered nature of my dependent variables, I would have to use an
estimation procedure designed to take it into consideration, such as ordered logit.
However, methodologically, I have yet another potential problem to overcome. This
problem is inherently imbedded in the very nature of the data that I am using.
Specifically, my dependent variables and macroeconomic indicators are, in fact,
measured at different levels. The unit of analysis of the sociotropic economic
perceptions (the dependent variables) is an individual, whereas the unit of analysis
of the objective economic indicators is a country. In case of multilevel or
hierarchical data, traditional estimation methods, such as OLS, logit or ordered
logit, do not produce the most efficient standard errors. In fact, they underestimate
standard errors, which may lead to a higher risk of falsely rejecting the null
hypothesis. Moreover, with the introduction of macro-level explanatory variables, it
is no longer possible to use national dummy variables. Country dummies, which
take care of a potential estimation bias due to omitted relevant effects measured at
the level of a nation, produce perfect collinearity when used in the same model with
substantive macro-level variables.
Estimation procedures for hierarchical models5 have become increasingly
available to researchers either as specially designed statistical packages (e.g.
MLwiN) or as a part of widely used statistical programs such as Stata. To increase
the likelihood of obtaining unbiased and efficient estimates, I used the GLLAMM
(Generalized Linear Latent and Mixed Models) estimation procedure with the
ordered logit link function compatible with the Stata framework. In addition, I
estimated the models with regular ordered logit for comparison purposes and as a
reliability check to make sure the results were not just an artifact of the estimation
method (ordered logit results are available from the author).
5 A two-level hierarchical model can be given by the following notation:






bp0xrij þ u0j þ eij, where b0 is the intercept or constant,
PQ
q¼1
b0qzqj is a set of
Q level-2 predictors zqj (q = 1,…,Q),
PP
p¼1
b0qxpij is a set of P level-1 predictors xpij (p = 1,…,P), u0j is the
residual level-2 variation in the level-1 intercept, and eij is the disturbance capturing omitted level-1
predictors.
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Table 2 presents the results for the retrospective models analyzed by the
hierarchical estimator. In the first column, the baseline model is estimated for the
sample of survey respondents from all seventeen countries. Two of the macro-
economic estimates, inflation and growth, achieved the conventional levels of
statistical significance, and the unemployment coefficient was not significant,
although with the negative sign consistent with the reward-punishment hypothesis.
The coefficients for inflation and GDP growth have the signs expected under the
operation of the reward-punishment mechanism (Table 3).
Substantively, however, the positive effect of economic growth seems to be
stronger than the negative effect of inflation. The total shift in the probability of
forming favorable retrospective perceptions attributed to the growth variables is
approximately 18.7% holding all the other variables at their means. In other words,
moving up from the minimum to the maximum on the growth variable shifts the
probability of having positive economic perceptions from 4 to 22.7%. The total
effect of inflation is substantively much smaller.6
In line with the second hypothesis, personal economic perceptions, evaluations of
political reforms, feelings about the market as well as favorable sentiments toward
the new regime correlate strongly with retrospective perceptions of the national
economy. Perceived change in personal economic conditions is the strongest
predictor of national economic evaluations. Specifically, the probability of having
favorable retrospective perceptions increases from 4% among those who felt their
own financial situation had gotten much worse to 49.5% among those who saw their
financial situation having improved significantly. Also, individuals who liked the
new political system better than the old one were 4% more likely to evaluate the
national economy positively.
There seems to be only a weak mediating effect, however, of the system support
variable on the relationship between objective economic indicators and retrospec-
tive sociotropic perceptions. This indicates that those who liked the new political
system better than the old one did not seem to use economic information any
differently than those more sympathetic to the old regime except in the case of
inflation. The only significant interaction is between system support and inflation.
Substantively, for instance, supporters of the new regime in the most economically
successful country, Poland, were estimated to have a 21% probability of forming
favorable perceptions of the economy, whereas Polish adherents of the old regime
were only 15.3% likely to have optimistic assessments. In Ukraine, the least
successful nation with regard to inflation, supporters of the reforms were 15.6%
likely to have favorable perceptions, while supporters of the old regime had the
probability of forming positive economic sentiments of 11%. Given these results, it
is reasonable to speculate that favorable feelings towards the new regime made
people more tolerant of economic hardships.
The contingent effect of education on the relationship between objective
economic indicators and retrospective perceptions is hardly noticeable. Although
6 The total effect of the inflation variable across its enormously wide range (minimum of -260% to
maximum of 2,570%) constitutes a -5.8% change in the probability of evaluating the past national
economy positively. Put differently, the probability of having favorable retrospective perceptions
decreases from 21.1 to 15.3% when moving from the lowest to the highest rate of inflation.
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statistically significant, the difference in the probability of forming unfavorable
economic perceptions as a function of growing inflation varies by less than 1.5%
between the two educational groups. The negative effect of unemployment is even
more negligible.
Finally, frequent political discussions did not generate more awareness of the
national economic conditions or at least higher reliance on objective information
when forming sociotropic assessments of the economy. Worth noting, however, is
the independent negative effect of political discussion on past economic percep-
tions, which is both statistically and substantively significant. The finding echoes
previous works on political discourse in post-communist societies, which
documented its negative nature.
The impact of objective economic conditions on perceived future economy is
quite minimal. Statistically, the only significant relationship is between the rate of
unemployment and people’s economic forecasts, but the direction is positive, and
thus contrary to the reward-punishment thesis. This result, however, is consistent
with alternative government support models previously found in transitional
societies. Since system transitions do not happen overnight and are expected to
create better economic opportunities, people may stay optimistic about the future
when the current economic conditions are deteriorating. They may, in fact, interpret
it as a sign of working reforms. Subjective evaluations of personal economy,
retrospective sociotropic perceptions, as well as satisfaction with political and
economic reforms also associate with national economic forecasts. However, we
should be cautious with identifying the direction of these relationships. As with
almost any cross-national survey study, there is a concern with some variables being
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retrospective perceptions may determine economic forecasts, people’s optimism
about the future projected back to retrospective economic evaluations. The
interaction variables with system support, education and political discussion in
any of the models failed to achieve conventional levels of statistical significance.
Those who held favorable attitudes toward the new political system and transition
reforms were, on average, more likely to believe in the brighter economic future.
Those who felt more pessimistic about the politico-economic transformation were
also more skeptical about the prospects of the national economy regardless of the
objective economic state.
Overall, the results of both retrospective and prospective models indicate a
substantively weak correlation between public perceptions and economic reality.
Whether a function of limited economic knowledge or high hopes for the future,
popular perceptions of the economy in the wake of post-communist transition could
hardly be considered a referendum on past economic performance. Instead they
looked more like a referendum on the newly established democratic system and a
reflection of people’s personal economic well-being. Notably, the degree of
economic accuracy was little affected by individuals’ cognitive resources.
Discussion and Conclusions
The current economic crisis brought the issue of public economic perceptions to the
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path and the speed of economic recovery and argue about the effectiveness of past
and current solutions, citizens, overwhelmed by the complexity of the discussion,
form their own judgments about the economy. According to one of the latest CNN
public opinion polls (October 5–7, 2010), only 17% of Americans believe that the
economy has started to recover, 44% think that it is stable, but not recovered, and
38% still feel the economy is in downturn.7 What could possibly explain this
variation in people’s sociotropic views when the media continuously reports on
main economic indicators? One explanation is that individuals have differing
personal economic experiences and extrapolate from them. However, most people
understand that their personal economic fortunes or misfortunes do not directly
translate to the macroeconomic situation. Yet they do not live in a vacuum. Through
the media and private discussions the public learns about the economic fate of their
fellow citizens. Adding this information to their own experiences gives people a
general idea of the national economy.
This is not the only explanation, however. Numerous studies of public opinion
and economic voting found that individuals tend to filter economic (and other)
information based on their political predispositions. The same CNN poll shows that
among Republican voters only 8% have a positive outlook on the economy, while
among Democrats 27% believe that the economic situation has been showing signs
of recovery. Negative views of the economy reveal even a starker contrast between
Democratic and Republican supporters. Whereas only 17% of the former think that
the economy is still in downturn, it is 47% of the latter who believe it is true. It is
noteworthy that these variations in sociotropic evaluations are not nearly as
pronounced across different age groups, educational levels or income levels.
When I started the current project, the major puzzle I saw was the level of
economic optimism in the wake of post-communist transition. How could anyone at
the end of 1992––one of the worst years in the economic history of that region––still
believe that the economy had been improving or have such high hopes for the
future? Voluminous theoretical and empirical studies on how people form
judgments in developed democracies led me to believe that similar mechanisms
(but with certain variations) should be at work in emerging democracies. When
information is scarce or complex, individuals have a tendency to rely on heuristics
and shortcuts of which the most powerful is their own personal experience. As
expected, during the early post-communist transition, individuals who felt their
personal economic situation was improving had a more optimistic outlook on the
national economy.
In addition, people look at the economy through the prism of their political
beliefs. With the collapse of the communist system and even before it, many
citizens in East Central Europe became disillusioned with the communist ideology
and the Communist Party. New political parties mushroomed in dozens bringing
about new ideological views, often radical or obscure. Lost in this sea of
information, the majority of post-communist citizens were cautious to form strong
allegiances to new political parties. Most, however, were able to express their views
7 The full results of the CNN poll can be found here: http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2010/images/
10/08/rel14a.pdf.
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about the new and old political order. These general attitudes towards the regime
transition served as heuristics for processing complex economic information. Those
who supported the new system were likely to form more positive retrospective and
prospective perceptions of the economy, whereas those opposed to it were more
likely to express negative views. In light of a high likelihood of endogeneity
between variables measuring political attitudes and economic perceptions, I
exercise caution while interpreting the magnitude of these effects.
Overall, the findings of this study demonstrate that in the face of uncertainty,
whether it is related to the past or future, people still make judgments on various
issues. In the countries of East Central Europe at the beginning of the post-
communist transition, uncertainty about new political and economic systems was
especially high due to the volatile economy, radical institutional changes, and
insufficient public knowledge about the systems. Low or unintuitive (with the
‘‘wrong’’ sign) correlation between objective economic indicators and individual
economic perceptions, according to some scholars of transition, does not necessarily
presume irrationality. Instead, post-communist citizens may have very well
understood that the radical systemic transformation could not happen overnight
and demonstrated a certain degree of patience in their economic assessments.
Moreover, others believe that state workers may have taken the deteriorating
economy as a sign that the reforms were going in the right direction. Market reforms
are expected to create more high-paying jobs in the private sector and improve
workers’ conditions in the long run. In fact, my results indicate that those approving
of the speed of the reforms were more likely to develop positive sentiments of the
economy (both retrospective and prospective).
Consequently, if we believe that economic voting existed during the early
transformation phase, as claimed by a number of studies (Pacek 1994; Przeworski
1996; Colton 1996; Harper 2000; Fidrmuc 2000a, b; Tucker 2002, 2006), it is
doubtful that post-communist citizens cast referendum votes based on the national
economic performance. Instead, it is likely that their voting behavior was motivated
by economic expectations or driven by personal experiences, political attitudes and
assessments of the transition reforms.
These arguments can certainly be generalized beyond the scope of the post-
communist transition in East Central Europe. Any country that undergoes an
economic and/or political transition, or experiences some sort of turmoil, may reveal
a greater disjuncture between public economic perceptions and economic reality.
This growing independence of economic assessments from the reality could be
either a sign of people’s inability to make accurate evaluations or, alternatively, a
shift in their judgments of the reality. A lack of congruence between objective and
subjective economies, in turn, may lead to a breach in the accountability
mechanism, which in new democracies may consequently result in authoritarian
backsliding.
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